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Abstract While trust is critical to microlending groups, much less is known about the vital 
factors and mechanisms that foster its emergence in microlending groups. This paper examines 
the practices of trust building and use in microlending groups. The results suggest that trust is 
produced and developed in microlending groups through a combination of calculative, 
prediction, intentionality, capability and transference mechanisms. These mechanisms are not 
mutually exclusive but act together to build trust. Though trust has general characteristics, 
whether and how it is formed and developed in microlending groups depends on context-
specific factors such as informal debt relations. Trust among group members is bolstered by 
multiplex relations of social events, neighbourhood, and friendship. The paper suggests that the 
unbanked population has a rich informal credit history. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Microfinance, defined as the provision of loans, savings, insurance, and payment services 
denominated in small amounts to segments of the population that formerly had no access to 
formal financial services (Baruah, 2010; Bruton et al., 2015; Guérin & Kumar, 2017; Servet, 
2015; Siwale & Okoye, 2017), has generated great interest in a number of academic disciplines. 
Unlike mainstream banking relationships where there are well-designed mechanisms, a high 
degree of trust is required if microlending groups are to function successfully.  
     According to transaction cost economics, in a world without transaction costs, all activities 
would be carried out as exchanges (Gulati, 1995). Notwithstanding this, the act of carrying out 
‘unregulated’ exchanges, synonymous with microlending group activities, has inherent risks. 
2 
 
Such risks often arise due to the vulnerability of relying on others and the possibility of 
incurring a loss (Anderson, Steinerte, & Russell 2010; Nooteboom, 2002). Perhaps, as a way to 
mitigate this vulnerability of actors engaged in non-collateral microlending group activities, 
trust can function as a control mechanism (Das & Teng, 1998). When explaining trust as a 
control mechanism in organisational groups and teams, Bradach & Eccles (1989) differentiated 
trust from control as regulation. Bradach & Eccles (1989) essentially used the term ‘controlling 
exchanges’ to mean the conduct and facilitation of transactions in cooperatives, effectively 
distinguishing it from the concept of control as regulation in quasi-markets.  
     It is therefore plausible to claim that trust can function as an effective control mechanism in 
non-collateral microlending group activities in countries characterised by weak institutions. 
Members of a microlending group – that operates based on joint liability – must have the 
assurance that other members will not act opportunistically by leaving the group after securing 
a loan, passing on the repayment responsibility to other members. In the absence of trust among 
group members, microlending group activities are likely to fail. 
     Although extant literature has examined microfinance (Baruah, 2010; Kotir & Obeng-
Odoom, 2009; Milanov et al., 2015; Sanyal, 2015, Servet, 2015), and trust (Altinay et al., 2014, 
Lascaux, 2015; van Bastelaer & Leathers, 2006, Ojong, 2018), much less is known about the 
mechanisms through which trust is produced among members in microlending groups.  More 
so, the cultural and contextual factors mediating trust-formation among borrowers are implicit 
in the extant scholarship. This study attempts to fill this lacuna in academic literature. 
     Specifically, the study provides new insights into how trust is produced, developed and 
employed in microlending groups in Cameroon. In doing so, it explores the calculative, 
intentionality, capability, prediction, and transference mechanisms of trust-building in the Sub-
Saharan African country. Crucially, we analyse the moderating effects of cultural dimensions 
and contextual factors comprising informal financial clubs and informal debt relationship using 
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the above-mentioned mechanisms. We address the following key question: how is trust formed 
and developed in a microlending group?  
     This study offers two primary contributions. First, we investigate how trust is produced and 
developed in microlending groups. We strictly utilise Doney et al’s (1998) framework 
comprising calculative, prediction, intentionality, capability, and transference trust-building 
mechanisms. Clearly, our contribution here is the interface between trust and microfinance. 
Second, the novelty of our study lies in the Cameroonian context we utilise. We draw attention 
to contextual influences (Elsner & Schwardt, 2015; Smallbone et al., 2014, Welter, 2012) in 
the country. Thus, we contribute to mainstream theories by exploring a non-mainstream context 
and acknowledging ‘the different contexts’ in which trust occurs (Welter, 2012, p. 193).  
     In the literature review that follows, we analyse microfinance and the group-based lending 
model, including the five mechanisms, highlighted above, through which trust can be produced 
and developed. The literature identifies that trust is indeed important for microlending group 
activities. Yet there is a research gap in our knowledge about how trust is produced and 
developed in microlending groups. In the next sections, we outline the research methodology 
and examine practices of trust building and use in microlending groups. We conclude by 
discussing the practical implications of the study findings.  
 
2. BACKGROUND LITERATURE 
 
2.1.The Provision of Microfinance 
Microfinance provision has attracted mainstream banks, investment funds, not-for-profit actors, 
insurance companies, mobile network operators (Bruton et al., 2015), and, more recently, 
internet-based crowdfunding intermediaries (Allison et al., 2015).  
     The group-based lending model is often used in environments with weak institutions and no 
formal collateral to secure loans (Carli & Uras, 2017; Milanov et al., 2015). Group lending 
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purports to transfer the screening, monitoring, and enforcement of loans to the collective of 
borrowers (Carli & Uras, 2017). The underlying logic behind the group lending model is that 
individuals within a group can be considered not eligible to get microloans but the group, as a 
whole, is creditworthy (Baland, Rohini & Zaki, 2014; Haldar & Stiglitz, 2016). Two strains of 
theorizing account for why group lending has proven so effective in encouraging high 
repayment rates: the borrower’s social ties and the idea that the group replaces conventional 
collateral with social collateral (Haldar & Stiglitz, 2016). Joint liability, that is ‘making 
borrowers liable for each other’s repayments in case of credit default’ is a major feature of 
group loan contracts (Carli & Uras, 2017, p. 72). In recent years, MFIs have begun using the 
group lending model without the joint liability clause which means that borrowers are no longer 
liable for each other’s loan repayments in case of default (Baland, Rohini & Zaki, 2014). In 
fact, group lending without joint liability has been successful due to the role of reputation (ibid). 
Clearly, borrowers using the joint liability group lending model are exposed to considerable 
risk. The inherent risk in such microlending groups highlights the importance of trust. Risk is 
required for trust to influence choice and behaviour (Lewis & Weigert 1985).  
 
2.2. Trust Formation and Microfinance 
Though scholars differ on the conceptualization of trust, there is however a consensus on some 
of its principal elements. For the sake of brevity and to allow us to move quickly to discuss the 
interface between trust and microfinance, we draw on previous work regarding the general 
nature of trust (see Ojong, 2018, p. 21-22). 
      Particularly significant to this discussion is the work by Doney & Cannon (1997) and 
Doney et al. (1998), which identifies five cognitive trust-building mechanisms: calculative, 
prediction, intentionality, capability, and transference. The authors note that the mechanisms 
trustors use to build trust may depend to a great degree on culture. Indeed, Hofstede (1980) 
indicates that trust is connected to broader cultural norms.  
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     Though trust may form through calculative, prediction, intentionality, capability, and 
transference mechanisms, whether and how it is formed depends on the societal values and 
norms that guide people’s behaviour and beliefs (Doney et al., 1998). Therefore, Hofstede 
(1980) identifies culture dimensions that influence trust-building mechanisms: 
individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity, high/low power distance, high/low 
uncertainty avoidance. According to the calculative mechanism, the trustor calculates the costs 
and rewards of a target cheating (Lindskold, 1978). Incentives and a rational assessment of 
rewards and punishments are the central tenets underlying calculative-based trust (Poppo, et al., 
2016). Doney et al. (1998) contend that individualism/collectivism, masculinity/femininity, 
high power distance, and low uncertainty avoidance dimensions influence the likelihood that 
people will act opportunistically. For instance, the probability that collectivists will act 
opportunistically is low as people hold group values and pursue collective interests (Hofstede, 
1984). Because of the collectivist culture, deterrence mechanisms, such as social sanctions, curb 
opportunistic behaviour by increasing the costs of cheating (Doney et al., 1998).  
     In the context of group-based microfinance, group members (in collectivist societies) would 
not act opportunistically since the costs of opportunistic behaviour (social sanctions) are high 
and outweigh the benefits of cheating. Similarly, members of microlending groups face high 
cost for acting opportunistically in feminine societies since people hold solidarity and 
cooperative norms and abhor self-serving behaviour. On the other hand, ‘tough’ values in 
masculine societies, such as assertiveness, visible achievement, and making money (Hofstede, 
1984), indicate that the potential benefits for acting opportunistically may exceed the costs 
(Doney et al., 1998).  
     Regarding power distance, Doney et al. (1998) contend that people in low power distance 
cultures are less likely to act opportunistically since such societies tend to adopt a participative 
decision-making process and hold norms of interdependence and solidarity, which is contrary 
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to high power distance cultures. On this premise, the authors argue that trustors in high power 
distance cultures are more likely to build trust via a calculative process. The level of risk 
tolerance in societies influences the assessments required for calculative trust formation 
(Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). Arguably, the fact that people in high uncertainty avoidance cultures 
display a strong resistance to change (Kale & Barnes, 1992) suggests that people are not likely 
to act opportunistically as doing so endangers continuation of the relationship (Doney et al., 
1998). Therefore, people in low uncertainty avoidance cultures are more likely to build trust 
through a calculative mechanism (Doney et al., 1998).  
     Trust based on prediction relies on a trustor’s ability to forecast the target’s behaviour 
(Rempel & Holmes, 1986). In the context of microfinance, prediction denotes an MFI’s ability 
to forecast that borrowers will be able to repay their loans (Aggarwal et al., 2015). Similarly, 
for joint liability microlending groups, members would only select people whom they are able 
to forecast their loan repayment ability. Put simply, group members should be able to forecast 
the repayment ability of one another. Servet (1997) notes that trust develops from expectations 
of how a person will act or behave based on that person’s past behaviour and their explicit and 
implicit claims. Trust then emerges from a prediction process whereby a partner determines 
that another’s past actions provide a reasonable basis upon which to predict their future 
behaviour with accuracy (Doney et al., 1998). The behaviour and past actions of another partner 
requires information gathering across multiple interactions (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996). 
Memory, then, is a key ingredient since it enables a partner to compare past actions and 
behaviour of the other partner (Servet, 1997).  
     Doney et al. (1998) suggest that under the cultural dimensions of collectivism, femininity, 
low power distance, and high uncertainty avoidance, trustors are more likely to form trust 
through a prediction mechanism. This follows from the fact that norms such as self-orientation, 
low loyalty to other people, and freedom to act individually, for example, run counter to a 
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predictable behaviour (Doney et al., 1998). Additionally, it is more difficult to predict with 
accuracy the behaviour of people who hold individualist values as the costs of opportunistic 
behaviour are low (since violators cannot be ostracised by a group) (Doney et al., 1998). 
      Trust emerges through an intentionality mechanism wherein one party interprets another 
party’s words and behaviour and tries to determine their intentions (Lindskold, 1978). From a 
microfinance perspective, forming trust through intentionality involves ascertaining the 
motivation and intention of borrowers to repay loans (Aggarwal et al., 2015). Doney et al. 
(1998) suggest that under cultural dimensions of collectivism, femininity, low power distance, 
and high uncertainty avoidance, trustors are likely to build trust through an intentionality 
mechanism. 
     The capability mechanism of trust building emerges from a trustor’s willingness to trust 
based on an evaluation of the target’s ability to meet their obligations as well as the trustor’s 
expectations (Doney et al., 1998). In the context of microfinance, trust formation through the 
capability mechanism involves an MFI’s willingness to trust based on an assessment of 
borrowers’ ability to repay loans (Aggarwal et al., 2015). Doney et al. (1998) suggest that in 
environments of individualism, masculinity, high power distance, and high uncertainty 
avoidance trust is more likely to form through a capability mechanism.  
     Finally, trust may emerge through a transference mechanism wherein trust is transferred 
from a known entity to an unknown one (Doney et al., 1998). Arguably, one may consider this 
transference process of trust formation as using a ‘third party’s definition of another as a basis 
for defining that other as trustworthy’ (Strub & Priest, 1976, p. 399). Seen in this light, trust is 
transferred from a trusted ‘proof source’—for example, from someone with good reputation 
and certification (Rousseau et al., 1998)—to another person. These proof sources enable the 
verification of the party’s trustworthiness and links known parties and unknown ones (Doney 
et al., 1998). Therefore, in order to establish trust through a transference process, trustors must 
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be able to identify proof sources and these sources must be perceived as being trustworthy 
(Doney et al., 1998). Doney et al. (1998) suggest that under Hofstede’s cultural dimensions of 
collectivism, femininity, low power distance, and high uncertainty avoidance trust is more 
likely to be formed through the transference mechanism. In the context of microfinance, trust 
is transferred from a trusted source, such as an individual or institution, to a borrower. This 
means that if trust is to be formed in microlending groups through the transference process, 
potential members of the group must identify a trustworthy source that serves as a proof source. 
     While some scholars (e.g., Aggarwal et al., 2015; Augustine, 2012; Dowla, 2006; Panda, 
2016; Sriram, 2005; van Bastelaer & Leathers, 2006; Ojong, 2018) have acknowledged the 
importance of trust in microfinance operations (Table 1), little attention has been directed to 
understanding practices of trust building and use in microlending groups. Aggarwal et al. 
(2015) briefly touched on trust formation in the microfinance domain but did not analyse how 
trust is produced, developed and employed since the focus of their study was to examine how 
MFIs target women borrowers to deal with low social trust. A recent study examined the role 
played by traditional leaders in the calculative and transference processes of trust building 
between MFIs and borrowers (Ojong, 2018). However, the study did not examine trust building 
among borrowers in microlending groups. This paper expands upon that study, including those 
of other scholars, by investigating practices of trust building and use in microlending groups, 
including how trust formation is mediated by contextual factors such as informal financial clubs 
and informal debt relations.1 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
1 By informal financial clubs we refer to rotating savings and credit associations (RoSCAs) and accumulating 
saving and credit associations (ASCAs). RoSCAs are ‘associations in which members regularly contribute to a 
fund that is given in whole or in part to each contributor in turn’ (Ardener, 2010, p. 11). ASCAs differ from 
RoSCAs in that the association distributes part of its fund as loans to members, and members get their share of the 
fund at the end of the cycle.  
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Table 1: Summary of Literature at the Interface Between Trust and Microfinance 
 
Authors                                                   Type                                        Summary 
Sriram (2005)                                        Conceptual                              Repeated transactions 
build up institutional 
memory, paving the way 
for organizational trust 
to possibly replace 
interpersonal trust. 
Aggarwal et al. (2015)                              Empirical                                  Microfinance institutions   
target women borrowers 
as a substitute for and to 
deal with low social 
trust. 
van Bastelaer and Leathers (2006)        Empirical                                Trust is strongly 
associated with 
repayment performance. 
Augustine (2012)                                   Empirical                                Transparency in all 
aspects of a 
microfinance 
institution’s operations 
creates trust with all its 
stakeholders. 
Dowla (2006)                                       Conceptual                              Borrowers tend to trust 
microfinance institutions 
that trust them too.  
Panda (2016)                                        Empirical                                Group formation based 
on peer trust. 
 
Ojong (2018)                                        Empirical                                Traditional leaders 
facilitate trust building 
between microfinance 
institutions and their 
borrowers. 
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3. METHODOLOGY 
 
 
3.1.The Context 
Given our approach, it is essential to describe our context (Pratt, 2009). Regarding cultural 
dimensions (Hofstede, 1984), Cameroon is a masculine and high-power distance country 
(Researchomatic, 2012). Also, it is a collectivist society though there is the emergence of 
individualism (Pirttilä-Backman et al., 2004). The emergence of individualism, especially in 
the urban areas, is attributed to people ‘getting more absorbed into the Western-dominated, 
global, free-market economies that emphasize the ideology of individualism’ (Mpofu 1994 
cited in Pirttilä-Backman et al., 2004, p. 495). Others contend that urbanization, socioeconomic 
crises, and education have contributed to the emergence of individualism (Marie, 1997). The 
predominantly collectivist state of most communities explains why trust is built through certain 
trust-building mechanisms.      
     This study focused on clients of an MFI that uses the group-based lending model. This MFI 
operates in Mezam and Boyo, administrative divisions that are situated in the North-West 
Region of Cameroon. Boyo is primarily a rural area, while Mezam is comprised of both urban 
and rural areas. Established in 1998, this MFI has a history of providing loans to the low-income 
population. 
     Borrowers form groups made up of five persons. Group members must be of the same gender 
and age range, and they cannot be family members.  
 
3.2. Methods Adopted 
A qualitative lens was adopted to examine practices of trust building and use in microlending 
groups. Such an approach can support development of a better understanding of a topic of 
interest (Denzin & Lincoln, 2011). The approach was appropriate because our objective was in 
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addressing the ‘how’ (than ‘how many’) and ‘articulating processes’ (Pratt, 2009, p. 856) of 
trust building in microlending groups.  
 
(i) Sampling 
The principal methodological strategy in selecting respondents at the outset was to have 
sufficient variety. To this end, we selected respondents from Mezam and Boyo, as they are 
regions that capture the rural-urban dynamics, which are vital to our study regarding practices 
of trust building and use. Respondents had various characteristics (Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Characteristics of Respondents     
                    Characteristic                     Percentage  
 
Gender 
Male 58.7% 
Female 41.3% 
 
 
 
Marital 
Status 
Single 4.3% 
Married 80.4% 
Divorced 2.3% 
Widow 13% 
 
 
    Age 
20<35 15.2% 
35<45 24% 
45<55 34.8% 
55> 26% 
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Source: Based on authors’ fieldwork, 2011 
 
     We selected an MFI that uses the group-based lending model since their clients would 
provide experiences appropriate for the study. This MFI, due to its group-based lending model, 
seemed to offer an ideal environment to study trust formation in groups. The MFI has centres 
made up of several groups. From each group, we selected respondents who had obtained a loan 
and were willing to have an interview (usually at least half of the group). The same process was 
done in both rural and urban zones to capture diversity.  
 
(ii) Data collection 
One author’s established relationship with the management of this MFI facilitated research 
access to their borrowers and employees. The author attended group meetings in the presence 
of loan officers. 
 
(iii) Interviews 
Our qualitative approach is endowed with its own criteria of rigour, including contextualisation 
and saturation (Guérin & Kumar, 2017). A total of 51 face-to-face semi-structured interviews 
with clients (46) and employees (five) of the MFI were completed. Interviewing MFI employees 
also made it possible to corroborate the narratives of the borrowers. Some follow-up telephone 
interviews were conducted to get additional information on issues that were missed during the 
first interviews (Taylor, 1984). To facilitate the disclosure of information, it was made clear to 
respondents that the information they provided would not be passed on to any third party and 
 
 
 
Level of 
education 
Primary 71.7% 
Secondary 19.6% 
University 2.2% 
No formal education 6.5% 
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would be anonymised. Selected respondents were proficient in English and/or Pidgin (the most 
commonly spoken local language). A translator was not needed as one of the study’s authors, 
who conducted the interviews, is also proficient in Pidgin.  
     Some interviews were conducted independently in private areas at the branch offices of the 
MFI (ensuring there was no monitoring by MFI staff in order not to influence responses). Other 
interviews were conducted at respondents’ homes and places of business.  
    
(iv) Analysis technique 
Data collected was sorted before analysis could begin. The sorting process meant interviews 
conducted in Pidgin were translated into English by one of the authors and all interviews were 
transcribed. Interviews were read several times and emerging concepts were grouped into 
categories using open coding (Corbin & Strauss, 2008) to develop first-order concepts. First-
order concepts were subsequently categorized into second-order themes (Corley & Gioia 2004; 
Pratt, 2009). NVivo 8.0 assisted our analysis. 
 
4. TRUST-BUILDING MECHANISMS IN MICROLENDING GROUPS 
 
As noted earlier in this discussion, potential clients of the MFI are required to form groups in 
order to get loans. Trust underpins the proper functioning of groups and is of vital importance 
especially in this local context characterised by institutional deficiencies. How, then, are 
trusting relationships produced, developed and employed in microlending groups?  
 
4.1. Factors that Influence Trust Building in Microlending Groups 
 
Contextual factors, such as informal debt relationships, are crucial to trust formation. For a start, 
groups are formed by individuals who are acquainted with the actions and behaviour of one 
another. Usually, potential members of a group have the opportunity to take part in social events 
(such as marriage, birth, and funeral ceremonies) and engage in several interactions with other 
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members of informal financial clubs, while those in similar trades engage with their peers on a 
frequent basis. Spatial proximity with other potential members, therefore, is a key factor. 
 
(i) Role of spatial proximity in trust building 
Spatial proximity makes it possible for people to attend similar social events. Additionally, it 
facilitates interactions among people in a particular community. Spatial proximity (Servet, 
1997) is vital to the intentionality and prediction processes of trust-building between potential 
members of a microlending group. The role of spatial proximity explains why a respondent said 
that ‘if I reside with a person in the same community, I will know about the person’s behaviour. 
I will know whether the person is troublesome’ (Interview 44). Spatial proximity enables 
frequent interactions and information gathering which makes it possible for people to predict 
future loan repayment behaviour of other potential members: 
[N]ormally, in life, when one deals with people, one knows those who are truthful 
and those who are not. Interactions enable one to gather information about a 
person, so you know the person you are dealing with. Also, in our African 
communities, we know people’s background and attitude because these are small 
communities (Interview 39). 
 
Given the frequent personal interactions, the prediction and intentionality mechanisms of trust 
building stand out in the formation of a microlending group as individuals have ample 
opportunity to examine the consistency of the past actions of others (which, as Doney et al. 
[1998] note, indicates future behaviour). From this perspective, a respondent said, ‘[s]ocial 
events make it possible to know who is who’ (Interview 45); another said, ‘[r]egarding social 
events, if that person [potential group member] does not associate with others, then, usually, 
such a person will not be able to establish social relations with others in the group’ (Interview 
42). A person who is not willing to participate in social events, as indicated by the respondent, 
displays individualistic traits which run contrary to the cultural dimension of collectivism. The 
individualist cannot be part of a microlending group because others cannot effectively assess 
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their motivation and intentions. This supports the point made by Doney et al. (1998) that, under 
the cultural dimension of individualism, trustors are unlikely to build trust through an 
intentionality mechanism. 
     Trust building through the intentionality process, in this context, requires potential members 
of a microlending group to know the motivation and intention of others regarding loan 
repayment (Aggarwal et al., 2015) before the formation of the group as noted by a respondent: 
‘[w]e choose those to be in the group. I had to be examined by the other members; then a 
decision was reached in favour of being part of the group. I have not had problems since being 
with them. No person causes a problem in the group’ (Interview 10). Again, spatial proximity 
facilitates shared visits and face-to-face interactions, which make it possible to know the 
motivation and intention of others by interpreting their words and behaviour. Information and 
experience allow parties to evaluate trustworthiness (Nooteboom, 2002; Servet, 1997), and this 
knowledge and experience gained during interactions make it possible for trust ‘to take root’ 
(Coriat & Guennif, 1998, p. 54). Informal conversations and frequent interactions make it 
possible to judge a potential group member’s attitude. While acknowledging that trust may also 
precede experience (Welter, 2012), arguably, ‘a trust-based relationship will only survive if it 
is supported by experience’ Coriat & Guennif (1998, p. 54). 
 
(ii) Informal debt relations as key ingredients in trust building in microlending groups 
 
Informal loans from neighbours and the purchase of goods on credit from local shopkeepers are 
vital to the intentionality and prediction mechanisms of trust building. For example, people 
often get loan requests from neighbours to meet household needs as expressed by a respondent: 
‘when I have challenges, for instance, when my wife is sick, I explain the situation to my 
neighbour. So, he lends me money, and I repay when I have money’ (Interview 15). By repaying 
the loans, borrowers send a signal that they are trustworthy. Trustworthiness is a key 
requirement for those who seek to join a microlending group—even before the formation of a 
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group, people in a community have information regarding potential members. Elsner & 
Schwardt (2015) contend that trustworthiness depends on people going against short-run gains. 
However, according to our study, some urban residents go for short-run gains since the benefits 
of cheating outweigh the costs. This was particularly predominant among the 20-35 age group. 
Several factors account for this behaviour. First, people in this age bracket tend to be more 
individualistic. Second, people in this age group were single, which further facilitated their 
movement from one region to another. Once they act opportunistically in a particular area, they 
relocate to another region where they are unknown to people in that community. A respondent 
said, ‘I have friends who followed my footsteps and took a loan, some of them have relocated 
because they weren't able to repay the loan’ (Interview 31).  
     Additionally, people approached shopkeepers in the local community for groceries on credit. 
This practice was pervasive in our study. A respondent said, ‘as we are in the community, if a 
guest arrives without prior notice, I go to the provision store owned by my neighbour and say, 
please, I wish to purchase four bottles of beer and two bars of Savon on credit; then I pay back 
for the goods later’ (Interview 27). These informal transactions create debt relationships 
between people in these communities. Debt relationships enable people to know individuals 
who are trustworthy.    
      Honesty and reliability were indicated by respondents as vital to trust building: ‘the secret 
[in a debt relationship] is to be honest. If I purchase groceries on credit from a friend's provision 
store, I make sure that payment is made immediately when I have it [money], even if I’m left 
with nothing’ (Interview 30). Honesty and reliability constitute some of the key characteristics 
of a trustworthy partner (Altinay, Saunders, & Wang. 2014; Nooteboom, 2002). People who 
pay for groceries purchased on credit or repay a loan owed to a neighbour build up their ‘credit 
history’. In this way, informal debt relationships in local communities enhance a person’s credit 
history. Therefore, this type of information gathered facilitates trust building through the 
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intentionality and prediction mechanisms. By failing to repay money owed to a neighbour or a 
shopkeeper (indicative of past repayment performance), potential members of a microlending 
group can forecast that the loan defaulters would likely default on a loan provided by an MFI 
if they are allowed to join a microlending group. Therefore, informal debt relationships in local 
communities also enable people to know the intention and motivation of potential microlending 
group members. This suggests that informal debt relationship plays an intermediary role in trust 
formation.  
 
(iii) Role of Informal financial clubs in trust building 
 
Informal financial clubs are vital to several mechanisms of trust formation. In our study, 91.3% 
of respondents were members of at least one informal financial club. In addition to meeting the 
financial needs of its members, these informal financial clubs serve as platforms to socialize: 
‘one must belong to a njangi [Informal financial club] because, after everything, one must 
socialize’ (Interview 1).2 Members of informal financial clubs meet on a regular basis: weekly, 
fortnightly, and monthly. The frequent meetings and numerous interactions facilitate the 
gathering of information.  
     Information gathered through multiple interactions between members of these clubs make it 
possible to forecast a person’s behaviour and benevolent intentions as well as to determine the 
reliability and dependability of a potential microlending group member. For example, members 
of an informal financial club who act opportunistically by defaulting on a loan send a signal to 
other members about their motivation should they join a microlending group with the aim of 
obtaining a loan from an MFI. Thus, trust arises from the recommendations of members within 
the group (Williamson, 1993). Trust also relies on reputation—information possessed by 
individuals about a potential member of a microlending group regarding their behaviour in prior 
                                                           
2 An informal financial club is locally referred to as njangi and tontine in Anglophone and Francophone 
Cameroon respectively. 
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network or group relations (Welter & Smallbone, 2006). Accordingly, reliability and 
dependability in previous interactions and experiences (Rousseau et al., 1998) generate positive 
expectations about the motivation and intention of a potential microlending group member 
regarding repayment of loans that will be granted by the MFI.  
     Trust formation by means of the transference mechanism involves the transfer of trust from 
a known party to an unknown party (Doney et al., 1998). A respondent describes this process 
in the microfinance context: ‘I was a member of a njangi [informal financial club]. The main 
reason why I joined it was to bring the members here [MFI]. At least ten of them have registered’ 
(Interview 46). The reason why other microlending members accept the new members and the 
MFI registers them is because they know the existing client and are aware of their past positive 
loan repayment experience. Trust of the existing client (proof source) leads to other registered 
clients. Doney et al. (1998) note that transference-based trust assumes that persons that act as a 
proof source are themselves trustworthy. Of course, this transference process is made possible 
due to the collectivist and high uncertainty avoidance culture of rural regions. Tight integration 
in a collectivist culture (Kale & Barnes, 1992) is contrary to a loosely knit social framework in 
an individualist culture (Ueno & Sekaran, 1992). Therefore, this tight integration facilitates the 
transfer of trust from an existing member (trusted proof source) to an unknown person. Table 3 
displays examples regarding the various trust-building mechanisms. 
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Table 3: Trust-building Processes and Corresponding Constructs 
 
 
          Trust-building mechanism                Constructs based on interviews 
Calculative: Trustor is aware of the costs 
and/or rewards of a target acting 
opportunistically (Doney & Cannon, 
1997; Doney et al., 1998) 
• “The [loan] defaulter will be isolated in that 
community. They will not be able to join 
other groups.” 
Prediction: Trustor develops confidence 
that target’s behaviour can be predicted 
(Doney & Cannon, 1997; Doney et al., 
1998) 
• “A starting point is to find out whether the 
potential member was once a member of a 
group. If the person was a member of a 
group, then we find out if the person had 
defaulted on a loan. If the person had 
defaulted once or twice, then we can forecast 
that the person is likely to default.” 
• “If a person often quarrels with their spouse, 
we know that such a person will cause 
problems in the group.” 
Capability: Trustor assesses the target’s 
ability to fulfil its promises (Doney & 
Cannon, 1997; Doney et al., 1998) 
• “First, the person has to be evaluated to find 
out if that person is the sort of person that 
will always fail the group. Second, the person 
should be hardworking.” 
• “The person [potential member] should have 
an income generating activity. For example, 
farming, animal husbandry, petty trading.” 
• “We know about people’s income generating 
activities. We know those who are 
hardworking and those who are lazy. A lazy 
person cannot join [a group].” 
Intentionality: Trustor evaluates the 
target’s motivations (Doney & Cannon 
1997; Doney et al., 1998) 
• “Since they [group members] live in the same 
community, they know the motivation of 
those in the community. They would admit a 
person to the group when they determine that 
the person will repay loans.” 
•  “Interactions enable one to gather 
information about a person, so you know the 
person you are dealing with.”  
 
Transference: Trustor draws on ‘proof 
sources,’ from which trust is transferred 
to the target (Doney & Cannon, 1997; 
Doney et al., 1998) 
• “One of the members may bring a person 
[potential member] to us since only a member 
can bring another person. We would have a 
discussion with the member who brought the 
person to find out whether the potential 
member possesses the characteristics we seek 
in order to join the group.” 
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(iv) Capability and calculative mechanisms of trust building in microlending groups 
 
Once a group is formed, developing trust is crucial to its success. Within a microlending group, 
members who get their loans later in the loan disbursement cycle expect that members who get 
theirs early in the loan disbursement cycle will honour their loan repayment commitments so 
that they too can get their loans. Arguably, trust is produced and developed through the 
capability mechanism whereby members of a group ensure that each member has the ability to 
repay loans (Aggarwal et al., 2015). Based on the capability mechanism, group members ensure 
that members are given a loan amount that they can repay. Asked whether they were given the 
loan amount requested, a respondent said, ‘[y]es, for some of us; I was given the 100,000CFA 
Franc [US$173] I asked. I believe that they look at your ability because several people ask and 
it [loan amount requested] isn’t given to them’ (Interview 15). Another respondent said that ‘a 
person may request 500,000CFA Franc [US$865] but will be given 50,000CFA Franc [US$86]. 
They know that 50,000CFA Franc[US$86] is sufficient for that person’ (Interview 23). 
     Group members are instrumental in determining the loan repayment ability of an individual 
in a group due to information asymmetry between the MFI and borrowers. On this point, a 
respondent noted that ‘a person may request a certain amount, but that person will not be given 
that amount […] group members would refuse that such an amount should be given to the 
person because they might not be able to manage the amount’ (Interview 1). The fact that the 
MFI considers the group’s recommendation suggests a transference process whereby the MFI 
trust the group (proof source) regarding an individual’s ability, and that trust is then transferred 
to the group member, who is unknown to the MFI. In this context, the capability and 
transference mechanisms are intertwined. 
     Members of a microlending group have various tools to facilitate an assessment of a 
member’s ability. For instance, the assessment of a group member’s ability to repay a loan 
provided by the MFI is also based on their past loan repayment performance in the community 
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and as a member of the informal financial club. Therefore, past loan repayment performance 
(‘ability’) helps others trust an individual in their group.  
     Regarding the calculative process, because of the high-power distance (Researchomatic, 
2012) and more collectivism than individualism in most communities in the country (Pirttilä-
Backman et al., 2004), particularly in the rural areas, the costs of opportunistic behaviour are 
quite significant. For example, a member who cheats will not be allowed to join another group 
as information rapidly disseminates throughout their community. A respondent explained some 
of the consequences of opportunistic behaviours: 
It would be difficult for a credit defaulter to join another group because news will 
spread that a member joined a group and failed to repay their loan. So, it tarnishes 
their image and makes it difficult for them to join another group except if they move 
to another community where they are unknown (Interview 44). 
 
The sanctions imposed on a member who acts opportunistically corroborates the point 
made by Welter (2012) that personal trust is often accompanied by sanctions (i.e., control 
mechanisms). At the micro-level, in our context, these social sanctions can include, for 
example, a loss of reputation for the person who acts cheats. 
     Additionally, as most members of a microlending group are also members of informal 
financial clubs, an opportunistic behaviour would affect one’s relationship in the club. Informal 
financial clubs, in our context, are very attractive for numerous reasons:  
In the njangi [informal financial club], we have a sinking fund. When there is a sad 
event, we withdraw money from it and assist a member. For example, we can 
withdraw 50,000 CFA Franc [US$81.85] from that fund […]. Examples of sad 
events include the loss of a parent, sibling or child, accidents, and sickness. In the 
case of a sad event, members would be physically present and express sympathy 
[…] A member can say that ‘I am sick and cannot buy drugs,’ members can assist 
that person. For example, each member might contribute 1000 CFA Franc 
[US$1.63], or they can lend the person the money required at a lower interest rate 
[…] Njangi is about solidarity; people want to share [...] people share information 
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regarding job opportunities and other opportunities they are aware of. They can also 
give members priority in terms of getting those job opportunities (Interview 43). 
 
The extensive benefits of being part of a social network means that a person would pay a 
relatively high price for an opportunistic behaviour. However, it is worth noting that the threat 
of sanctions does not dissuade some urban residents from acting opportunistically by defaulting 
on a loan repayment. In our study, microlending groups in urban areas recorded several cases 
where members deliberately decided to default on a loan repayment. The high loan delinquency 
rate in the urban zones is due to some of the factors mentioned earlier. Higher levels of 
individualism (when compared with rural zones) and cultural heterogeneity are other crucial 
factors that account for opportunistic behaviour. Unlike a previous study that showed Kenyan 
women are more responsive to social pressure—due to shame and embarrassment—than men 
(Johnson, 2005), our study found that urban women in microlending groups are not so 
responsive to social pressure. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
This article contributes to the literature at the interface between trust and microfinance. The 
study helps fill gaps in the literature by investigating the practices of trust building and use in 
microlending groups. Our findings regarding the importance of culture to trust-building are 
consistent with extant scholarship (Doney et al., 1998; Altinay et al., 2014). Unlike the previous 
studies, however, this research suggests that contextual factors, such as informal financial clubs, 
purchase of goods on credit from local shopkeepers, and other informal debt relationships 
mediate trust formation in microlending groups. This means there is a contextual sensitivity of 
trust building. Arguably, these contextual factors indicate habituation is crucial to trust 
development. Also, though trust has general characteristics, context-specific factors and 
mechanisms mediate its emergence. For instance, Doney et al. (1998) contend that trust is likely 
to form through the prediction and intentionality mechanisms in feminine societies. Our 
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findings suggest that trust can also develop through the prediction and intentionality 
mechanisms in masculine societies. We argue that some contextual factors facilitate trust 
development in masculine societies. Additionally, the establishment of debt relationships 
between individuals in communities facilitate the building of an individual’s ‘credit history’. 
The credit history provides rich information to tackle the problem of information asymmetry. 
This information enables microlending group members to determine the capability (ability) of 
other individuals to pay back loans. This information is transferred to the MFI that makes a 
final decision—on the basis of information received from the group (proof source)—regarding 
the loan amount to give an individual in a group. So, the capability and transference 
mechanisms are not mutually exclusive but are intimately intertwined.  
     Our findings have important practical implications for MFIs. In showing practices of trust 
building and use, we make apparent the mechanisms available to MFIs in low-income 
economies with weak institutions. MFIs could design mechanisms that enable them to make 
use of informal credit histories of potential borrowers. Perhaps doing so may help to reduce the 
risk of delivering formal financial services to low-income individuals with no formal credit 
history. Also, some cultural norms held by people shift even when they move within national 
boundaries. This explains why when some people move from rural communities, which tend to 
be collectivist, to urban areas, which are increasingly individualistic, they gradually become 
more individualistic. Therefore, an MFI should not assume that the same trust mechanisms that 
work in rural areas will work in urban areas. Trust must be analyzed through the eyes of each 
particular community. Taking into consideration contextual factors is crucial as it would avoid 
inappropriate transfer of so-called ‘best practices.’   
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